Cildanian Military OccupationKatā’ib takes over governmentBadaran auxiliary policeNovember 3973 - It has been two years since the Cildanian invasion of Badara, and throughout this time the Katā’ib was successful in expanding its effective control over most of the Badaran territory. Facing no other choice, the Ba'ath government was forced to accept the legality of the occupation, and in July last year the civilian government was dismissed and the Katā’ib took full control over the administration of Cildania's new province. However, after more than a year of military administration, Badara proves much easier to conquer than it is to govern. Although most of the warlords and Ahmadist insurgents have been defeated, they still pose a significant challenge to the numerically small Katā’ib, who is now receiving much-needed training and supplies from Cildania's allies in Dorvik. And although Cildania insists that its occupation is legal and in the best interest of Badarans, famously
proclaiming it has no intentions to colonize or to spread Hosianism, Badaran reception has been lukewarm at best. Many are indeed happy that the warlords and Ahmadists are no longer major players in Badara, but few hide their contempt towards a foreign occupation they see as no different from the one in Kafuristan. And in spite of the Katā’ib's proclamations, only the most naïve fail to see the primarily self-serving character of the Cildanian invasion. Ever since the proclamation of the Ahmadi State, the chaos and violence on the islands has impacted Cildania (including the very notable moment of the Ahmadi State's attempted conquest of Cildania during the Civil War), while the neverending violence has led to an unstoppable stream of refugees, mostly Badaran Hosians, into Cildania. Moreover, Yugerten Baqar's regime hopes that, by putting an end to the century of violent persecution of Hosianism, it would regain the loyalty of its radical Apostolic constituents, who still remain one of the Baʿal's core supporters. Thus the Federal Republic hopes that, by stabilizing the Badaran islands, it would put an end to its own troubles and reinforce its legitimacy at home. Indeed, ever since the Katā’ib was granted its mandate to occupy Badara, Baʿal Baqar has enjoyed an unprecedentedly high approval rating, showing that Cildanians are eager to see their nation return to prominence after the humiliations of the Civil War.
The occupation of Badara is not, however, without significant international opposition. Initiated as a response to a perceived Chann threat, the takeover of the Badaran isles has received strong condemnation from the regime in Kafuristan. Moreover, as an ally of Vanuku, Cildania's actions have brought the nation into the spotlight of the growing international tensions between Vanuku and Trigunia and their respective allies. Aldegar, until now uninvolved in Majatran affairs, has established ever closer political ties to the Chann regime in Kafuristan, shifting the focus of Terran great power politics away from the Aldegar Canal and towards the Majatran Isles. More worryingly for Cildania is the
threat by Trigunia that it would be sending peacekeepers to Badara, which, if it does happen, would turn the small regional dispute between two minor powers into a large-scale inter-continental conflict, particularly since Cildania's ally Dorvik
announced it would interdict the Trigunian fleet.
But even if Trigunia does not intervene in Badara, Cildania's control over the islands is far from assured. If the Federal Republic plays its cards right, it will have access to a large oil supply, a stable and loyal puppet, and high popular support at home. However, if the Katā’ib fails to succeed at what it was mandated to do, Cildania will be caught in a protracted and unwinnable guerilla war, which, given the state of the Cildanian economy, it can ill afford to do.